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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

CaseNo.20040685-CA

ABIGAIL FLORES GONZALES,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals from the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to
dismiss the charge of driving under the influence, a third degree felony upon
enhancement with priors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2003) (R. 1-2)
(statute is attached in Add. A). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Without notice to or inputfromthe parties, did the trial court erroneously
determine that the State should have but failed to establish compliance with Rule 9301(2)(B), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, in the taking of defendant's two prior
DUI guilty pleas?

A ruling on a motion to dismiss is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
See State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 416,17, 82 P.3d 219; State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981
(Utah App. 1995).
Preservation: The challenge involves the presumption of regularity, which was
discussed numerous times below (R. 43-46, 61-63, 132-33, 147-51; R. 186: 3-9, 31-34,
79-80). The prosecutor sought reconsideration of the trial court's opinion following its
issuance (R. 153-54).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
Rule 9-301, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, is relevant to the issue on
appeal (in Add, A).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol [DUI],
enhanced to a third degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2003),
based on two or more prior convictions under the same statute within ten years of the
instant violation (R. 1-2). One of defendant's friends interpreted for him at his initial
appearance, after which defendant hired his own counsel (R. 5-7). At the preliminary
hearing October 16, 2002, the State proffered the arresting officer's testimony that
defendant had a blood alcohol content of .176 (R. 42-43). The State also submitted
certified records of defendant's prior DUI convictions based on guilty pleas in two

2

different Justice Courts: one in Grand County in 1997 and one in Emery County in 2001
(R. 25,42-43,60,114).
Defendant moved to dismiss the enhanced charge, filing two supporting
memoranda which argued that reliance on the prior Justice Court convictions would
violate his constitutional due process rights because: 1) Justice Courts are not courts of
record; 2) Justice Court judges are not "law trained"; and 3) defendant was not informed
of the potential enhancement effect his guilty pleas could have (R. 11-38, 48-58).
Following briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the matter was temporarily suspended
pending a decision in two appellate cases involving a similar issue (R. 11-34, 42-58, 6064, 70-73).1
Thereafter, defendant filed another motion to dismiss, arguing his previous points
and adding two more: 1) the language of the DUI statute does not permit the use of prior
convictions to enhance violations occurring after July 1, 2001; and 2) the Justice Courts'
jurisdiction extends to "petty offenses" only, which does not include driving under the
influence of alcohol (R. 87-90). Following briefing, the trial court issued a ruling
granting defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 83-84, 87-94, 102-44) (ruling attached in Add.
B). The court rejected all of defendant's arguments and ruled instead on an issue raised

1

Those cases, State v. Soto, 2003 UT App 382 (unpublished), and State v.
Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, 81 P.3d 775, were argued June 19, 2003. Although the
record does not contain an order by the trial court suspending the proceedings, nothing
appears in the record between June 11, 2003, and February 5, 2004, when the parties in
this case were notified of the arraignment scheduled for February 18 (R. 76-78).
3

sua sponte by the trial judge without input from either party (R. 148-51). Add. B. The
trial judge found that "the State did not meet its burden of proving compliance with Rule
9-301, [Utah Code of Judicial Administration] and therefore the prior judgements may not
be used to enhance the punishments and/or degree of offense provided for by multiple
convictions under Utah Law" (R. 148). Add. B. The prosecutor sought reconsideration
of the decision, in response to which the trial judge affirmed the dismissal without further
briefing or argument from the parties (R. 153-71) (motion and ruling attached in Add. C).
The State timely appealed (R. 172-73).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 2, 2002, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol (R. 1-2, 42-43). His blood alcohol content was found to be .176 (R. 42).
According to defense counsel, defendant was stopped for improper lane travel in Green
River, Utah (R. 114). The officer obtained defendant's driver's license and could smell
alcohol on defendant's breath (id). Defendant failed subsequent field sobriety tests (id).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused it's discretion in dismissing the enhanced charged based on
the State's failure to establish that the written statements used in both Justice Courts
complied with Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 9-301(2)(B). The dismissal
occurred despite the fact that the parties had no notice of the issue and no meaningful
opportunity to address it prior to issuance of the trial judge's decision. The matter was
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raised sua sponte by the trial judge after the case had been submitted for decision and was
the sole basis for the dismissal of the charge.
The trial judge erred in raising and addressing the issue without notice to or
opportunity for input from the parties because it improperly subverted the unrebutted
presumption to which the State was entitled by law. The prosecutor's production of
certified copies of the prior judgments gave rise to a rebuttable presumption of regularity
in those prior pleas. The trial judge ruled that defendant failed to shift that burden, and he
rejected the claims defendant had raised. Accordingly, the burden of establishing the
voluntariness of the prior pleas never shifted back to the State, and dismissal was not
warranted. Moreover, the evidence adduced in the course of the hearing on defendant's
claims establishes that both Justice Courts used written statements and that those
statements were available had the parties had notice of the compliance issue on which the
case would be decided.
Additionally, because defendant had not raised the issue, the ruling placed the trial
judge in the role of advocate—a role he repeated when he ruled on the prosecutor's
motion for reconsideration without seeking any input from defendant. Such action is to
be viewed with disapproval as contrary to the interests of justice.
Further, the judge's invalidation of the prior pleas for enhancement purposes is
exactly what this Court determined should not happen in State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App
381,81 P.3d 775. Defendant did not establish, and the trial judge did notfind,that the

5

prior pleas were, in fact, unknowing or involuntary, which is required in the course of a
collateral attack on the prior pleas. Hence, under Marshall, there was not a sufficient
basis upon which to invalidate the pleas for enhancement purposes.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE ENHANCED
CHARGED BASED ON A SUA SPONTE ISSUE WITHOUT NOTICE
TO THE PARTIES OR AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD,
THEREBY IMPROPERLY DISPENSING WITH THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AS WELL AS
INAPPROPRIATELY ADVOCATING ON DEFENDANT'S
BEHALF
The trial court dismissed the enhanced charge against defendant because the State
failed to prove that when defendant entered his previous guilty pleas in two Justice
Courts, he signed in each court "a statement acknowledging that [ h e ] . . . understood] his
rights and that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive[d] those rights" (R. 149).
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 9-301. The court, abused its discretion in
dismissing the charge because the prosecutor was entitled to the benefit of the unrebutted
presumption of regularity which had attached when certified copies of the prior
judgments were presented at the preliminary hearing. Further, the trial judge became an
advocate for defendant by means of his ruling, advancing an issue defendant could have
but failed to raise and using it to rule in defendant's favor without prior input from the
prosecution.

6

A.

The Rule and the Ruling
The charged enhancement was based on two prior guilty pleas entered in two

different Justice Courts. Rule 9-301, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (UDJA),
provides:
(1) At the time of arraignment, the justice court judge shall
determine whether the defendant would be subject to an enhanced penalty if
convicted of the same offense in the future.
(2) If the defendant would be subject to an enhanced penalty, upon
the entry of a plea of guilty, the justice court judge shall:
(A) Advise the defendant, orally and in writing[,] of
the defendant's rights, the elements of the charged offense,
the penalties for the charged offense, and the enhancement
penalty which maybe imposed in the event the defendant is
convicted of the same offense in the future; and
(B) Require the defendant to sign a statement
acknowledging that the defendant understands his rights and
that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives those
rights.
(3) Upon the entry of a guilty plea or receipt of a conviction, the
justice court judge shall execute a written and signed judgment of
conviction and forward the appropriate information and/or fingerprints to
the state agencies responsible for maintaining criminal records.
Add. A.
After considering defendant's two motions to dismiss, his three supporting
memoranda, the State's opposing memoranda, and the evidence adduced at the
evidentiary hearing and the parties' arguments thereafter, the trial court entered a written
ruling dismissing the enhanced charged without prejudice and permitting the prosecution
7

to "file a lesser offense if it feels [the] same is justified" (R. 149). Add. B. The judge
rejected all defendant's arguments and granted his motion on a sua sponte ground without
notice to or meaningful opportunity for input from the parties:
The Court believes that I must address Sua Sponte the question of
compliance by the Justice Court Judges with Rule 9-301, URJA [sic].
Neither Judge had evidence of a written advisory of rights and enhancement
possibilities required under Rule 9-301(2)(A), Judge Cox's policy was to
give written notice to defendant, but to destroy evidence thereof upon
completion of each case, only retaining the Citation, Information and
Judgment. His testimony did not confirm what he specifically did in this
case nor should we expect such specific memory after such a long time.
Judge Burnes said no copy of a Written Notice was in the file so she
thought one had not been given defendant although she had forms (as did
Judge Cox) that made such explanations. Counsel reviewed these forms
and I believe defense counsel referred to language therein in her
examination of her client. However, neither counsel offered the forms as
exhibits herein.
I agree with Judge Bryner's decision in State of Utah vs. Jose Luis
Telles, 021700133, especially, that the Judicial Council meant for the
failure of compliance with the Rule to have some consequence. I therefore
urge Justice Courts to issue and retain copies of such document(s).
However, they are only evidence of compliance.. .. [S]ince the forms were
not offered, and I don't know whether the forms have provision for
defendant's signature, I cannot conclude anything about the adequacy of the
form to comply with Rule 9-301(2)(B) URJA [sic]."
(R. 148-49) (emphasis in original).2 Add. B. The judge then ruled that "the State did not
meet its burden of proving compliance with Rule 9-301 URJA [sic] and therefore the

2

No additional reference to or explanation of State v. Telles appears in the record,
demonstrating the trial judge's efforts to research the issue.
8

prior judgements may not be used to enhance the punishments and/or degree of offense
provided for by multiple convictions under Utah Law" (R. 149). Add. B.
The prosecutor sought reconsideration, arguing that, contrary to the trial judge's
ruling, this Court's decision in State v. Marshall 2003 UT App 381, 81 P.3d 775, cert
denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004), dictated that a violation of Rule 9-301 would not
prevent use of the Justice Court convictions for enhancement purposes (R. 153-54). Add.
C. Without a response from defendant or argument by the parties, the trial judge issued
an order confirming its prior decision (R. 169-71). Add. C. The judge distinguished
Marshall, concluding
that the 'direct vs. collateral' dichotomy [used in Marshall] is useful with
respect to courts of record, but I believe that the judicial council in
promulgating the rule had in mind the distinction between Justice Courts
and Courts of Record, and expected compliance with that rule, and I believe
they anticipated consequences of non-compliance. The Court has
concluded in this case that the state failed to prove compliance and
therefore I am left with determining what consequences non-compliance
should have. My determination is that non-compliance with the rule should
have the effect of preventing the state from using any conviction before a
Justice of the Peace /Court where the evidence does not show by a
preponderance that the rule was in fact complied with. I note that the rule
provides for oral and written specifics and further a signature of the
defendant. In the case before this Court, to wit the Gonzales case, the state
failed to prove that compliance and therefore the Court ordered the
dismissal and after review confirms that decision as of this date.
(R. 169). Add. C.
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B.

The Trial Court Erred by Basing His Decision on an Issue Neither Raised nor
Argued by the Parties with no Meaningful Opportunity by the State to
Defend or Adduce the Evidence at Issue
The trial judge abused his discretion in dismissing the enhanced charged because,

in doing so, he eradicated the presumption of regularity which arose under the law, and he
became an advocate for defendant, excusing defendant's failure to raise an issue,
conducting independent research, and ruling in defendant's favor with no input from him
and no meaningful opportunity for input from the prosecutor,,
The ruling constitutes error because it is contrary to the presumption of regularity
that arose by law and remained unrebutted in this case. See State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d
146, 149 (Utah 1989). Defendant below attempted to invalidate the prior Justice Court
pleas to prevent their use to enhance his charge to a felony. To do so, he claimed a
violation of his right to counsel in both his prior cases and argued generally that pleas
entered in Justice Courts were unavailable for enhancement purposes in any event (R. 1138, 48-58, 87-90). His was a collateral attack on the prior pleas, which pleas must be
upheld if they were entered voluntarily. See State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, ^ 7, 68
P.3d 1035 (addressing a collateral attack on prior guilty pleas entered in district court
under rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
This Court has repeatedly recognized the procedure for reviewing such challenges
to the use of prior convictions for enhancement purposes under the DUI statute.
[Ojnce the State has proven a prior conviction, a presumption of regularity
arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to produce 'some evidence' of
10

involuntariness. [State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146,149 (Utah 1989).] Upon a
showing of some evidence of involuntariness, the burden shifts back to the
State to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, f 7; see also State v. Pooler, 2002 UT App 299, f 7, 56 P.3d
979 (affirming trial court's denial of a motion to strike prior convictions where the State
properly introduced evidence of defendant's prior DUI convictions, and defendant
produced no evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity). The trial judge was fully
aware of this procedure throughout the proceedings below. He acknowledged that the
prosecutor met his initial burden by producing at both the preliminary hearing and the
evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion a certified copy of each of the two prior
judgments (R. 186: 3-5, 33). The judge noted the evidence and expressly shifted to
defendant the burden of proving his claims (R. 186: 4-6, 31-33). Defendant called and
examined one of the Justice Court judges, after which the trial judge reminded defendant
that he carried the burden of proof at that point and that his examination of his first
witness did nothing to shift the burden back to the State (R. 186: 31-34).
In his written ruling, the trial judge rejected the claims raised by defendant,
holding that defendant did not carry his burden of establishing "some evidence" to rebut
the presumption of regularity (R. 148). See Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149. The judge
explained that "[b]oth the presumption of regularity and the evidence preponderates to the
contrary [of what defendant claimed] and I would normally deny the Motion to Dismiss ..
.." (R. 151). This ruling comports with the established case law. See Triptow, 770 P.2d
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at 149; Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95,1f 7; Pooler, 2002 UT App 299,17. Under that law,
the burden of proof never shifted back to the State to establish the voluntariness of the
convictions by a preponderance of the evidence. See Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149 (once the
State introduced documents establishing the requisite prior convictions, defendant was
required both to raise his challenge to the presumption and to adduce evidence to support
it; his failure to do so left the presumption of regularity in place and resulted in
affirmance of his conviction on appeal); see also Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, \ 21;
Pooler, 2002 UT App 299, \ 7 ("Because Defendant failed to provide 'some evidence' to
rebut the initial presumption, the trial court could presume the regularity of the
proceedings.") (quoting Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149).
Instead of simply disposing of defendant's claims, the trial judge went on to
address sua sponte compliance by the Justice Court judges with Rule 9-301 (R. 148).
Add. B. He found that "the State did not meet its burden of proving compliance with" the
rule, with the result that "the prior judgments may not be used to enhance the punishments
and/or degree of offense provided for by multiple convictions under Utah Law" (R. 149).
Add. B. Specifically, he found that defendant had been advised of the necessary
information pursuant to subsection (2)(A), but that the prosecutor failed to offer into
evidence the written forms used by the Justice Court judges, thereby preventing the trial
court from determining whether the forms complied with the requirements of subsection

12

(2)(B) (R. 149).3 Add. B. Absent proof of compliance, the court ruled, the prior
convictions were unavailable for enhancement use (id).
The ruling eviscerated the presumption of regularity with no notice to the State that
the presumption was gone and no opportunity for the prosecutor to meet the resulting
burden of proving the requisite compliance with the rule. The trial judge recognized
numerous times that the presumption had arisen (R. 148; R. 186: 3-5, 32-34), that it had
not been rebutted (R. 148), and even that defendant had not raised a challenge involving
written compliance with subsection (2)(B) (R. 148). Yet, he went on to entirely dispense
with the presumption by raising, researching, and ruling on a new issue.
Such action has been viewed with disapproval in this jurisdiction, where it is
inappropriate for a trial court to raise an issue on behalf of a party and, thereby, act as an
advocate. See, e.g., Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680P.2d733, 736
(Utah 1984) ("[A] trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented
for determination. Any findings rendered outside the issues [presented] are a nullity.");

3

During the evidentiary hearing, it was established that both justices use a written
form in their courtroom to inform defendants of their rights and the potential for
enhancement (R. 186: 15-16, 21-23, 25-26, 35-36, 39-42, 48-50). The trial judge noted
that the parties used one of the forms in their examination of witnesses at the hearing (R.
149). Add. B. Because the evidence was aimed specifically at defendant's claims
regarding his right to counsel in the justice courts, neither party felt compelled to submit
the forms into evidence. However, it is clear on this record that the forms were available
and could have been produced had the parties known of the trial judge's concern with
subsection (2)(B). The testimony also suggests that the forms included all the necessary
rights and warned of the enhancement possibilities in compliance with the requirements
of subsection (2)(B) (R. 15-16, 18, 21-23, 25-26, 35, 39-40, 42-44, 48-50).
13

Girardv. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983) ("Preservation of the integrity of the
adversarial system of conducting trials precludes the court from infringing upon counsel's
role of advocacy . . . . [T]he interests of justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds
its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that would otherwise be dead . . .
."); Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374, 1382 (Utah App. 1994) (Bench, J., dissenting), cert
denied513 U.S. 1191 (1995); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com% 847 P.2d
418, 420-21 (Utah App 1993) (applying the same to administrative tribunals). Cf Birch
Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990, 993 (Utah 1993) (the trial court erred in
granting a permanent injunction on a motion for a preliminary injunction, regardless of
whether a permanent injunction would have been appropriate upon proper motion).
Further, the law requires that a defendant raise his claims and objections in the trial court
or waive them. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (setting forth and
explaining the "preservation rule"). Finally, defense counsel may choose the issues he
will raise as determined by his trial strategy. See State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, ^f
58, 57 P.3d 1139 (noting counsel's right to make legitimate strategic choices, no matter
how flawed they appear in retrospect). Defendant could have raised this issue, but he did
not. The court's conduct in not only raising and researching it, but resting its decision on
it, interferes with both the preservation rule and defendant's ability to manage his own
case, thereby amounting to impermissible advocacy by the court.
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That is not to say that the trial court cannot identify issues or concerns it believes
are relevant or crucial. However, the parties must be provided the opportunity to address
the matter, removing the trial judge from any appearance of advocacy. Cf. Preuss v.
Wilkerson, 858 P.2d 1362, 1362-63 (Utah 1993) (trial court must provide notice and an
opportunity to be heard before dismissing a claim for failure to prosecute); Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) ("Timely and adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural
fairness."); Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah App. 1997) (where the trial court
issued a decision stating it was considering sanctions against a party and stating that a
hearing would be held to permit input, then imposed sanctions without the hearing or
otherwise calling for a response, the appellate court reversed the sanctions and remanded
to permit appellant an opportunity to be heard); Jenkins, 868 P.2d at 1383 ("The right to
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard is a critical part of our judicial system . . . . A
method of resolving cases that bypasses this requirement can not be accepted as a fair,
neutral, and rational process.'") (Bench, J., dissenting) (quoting Rubins v. Plummer, 813
P.2d 778, 780 (Colo.App. 1990).
In our judicial system, except in extraordinary circumstances . . . , all
parties are entitled to notice that a particular issue is being considered by a
court and to an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that issue
before decision. The failure to give adequate notice and opportunity to
participate can constitute a denial of due process under article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution.
Plumb v. State , 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990).
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That did not occur in any meaningful way in this case. Although the trial judge
initially indicated a concern regarding rule 9-301, he did not identify the problem, and,
over time, the parties ultimately believed that the matter was no longer an issue.
Two months after the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge notified the parties that he
wanted oral argument "on the effect of Rule 9-301 URJA on the issues involved in
previous oral arguments . . . . " (R. 67). No specifics were included, no written input was
requested, and subsection (2)(B) was not identified. The argument was continued one
month upon stipulation of counsel (R. 69). However, defendant thereafter moved to
vacate argument because the issue was included in two court of appeals cases scheduled
to be argued within the following five weeks: State v. Soto, 2003 UT App 382
(unpublished) and State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381,81 P.3d 775 (R. 70) (both
attached in Add. D).4 The trial judge granted the motion, and defendant immediately
moved to submit the matter for decision, apparently positioning himself to avoid any
adverse appellate ruling on the matter (R. 72-74). The State objected, and nothing fiirther
occurred in this case pending a resolution of the appellate cases (R. 75). Those cases
were resolved in the State's favor five months later. See Marshall, 2003 UT App 381,81
P.3d 775; Soto, 2003 UT App 382 (unpublished).5
4

Both cases were defense appeals involving interpretation of the statutory DUI
enhancement provision. Both included an ex post facto challenge, and Marshall included
a due process argument.
5

Marshall involved a defendant charged in district court with a felony DUI
enhanced due to two prior DUI convictions entered in Justice Courts. 2003 UT App at fflf
16

Nearly three months after the appellate opinions issued, this case again became
active, and defendant filed another motion to dismiss (R. 77-84). None of the supporting
or opposing memoranda addressed rule 9-301 in any way (R. 83-84, 87-88, 91-94,10244). The State informed the trial court that defendant's claims had been decided against
him in Marshall and Soto (R. 91-92, 125). The matter was submitted on the written
documents with no objection from defendant and no request for oral argument (R. 14546). One month later, the court issued its written ruling, raising subsection (2)(B)

1,3. In ruling that Marshall had established neither his entitlement to nor the absence of
specific notice of future enhancement possibilities, the Court looked at Rule 9-301 and
observed that when a court is faced with enhancement of a DUI charge based on prior
DUI convictions arising from guilty pleas, "it does not follow that those pleas would be
invalidated for enhancement purposes based solely on a failure to comply with Rule 9301 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration." Id. at ^j 21, n.9. This Court reasoned
that invalidation of a prior conviction for enhancement purposes does not follow if the
problem with the conviction amounts to a violation of a prophylactic provision of a
procedural rule, explaining,
[F]ailure to comply with [procedural rules, including] rule 11 [of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure] in taking a guilty plea does not in itself
amount to a violation of a defendant's rights under either the Utah or the
United States Constitution. To [collaterally attack a conviction], a
petitioner must show more than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of
[a procedural rule]; he or she must show that the guilty plea was in fact not
knowing and voluntary.
Id (quoting Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993)). Absent proof that the
plea was not knowing and voluntary, the prior conviction remains valid for enhancement
purposes. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (requiring only "two prior convictions" as a
prerequisite to enhancement).
17

specifically for the first time and dismissing the enhanced charge based on that subsection
(R. 147-51). Add.B.
This series of events makes clear that the parties had no meaningful notice of or
opportunity to address the trial judge's concerns about subsection (2)(B). Although the
judge initially scheduled oral argument, he did so without mention of subsection (2)(B)
specifically. Both parties clearly felt that whatever concern rule 9-301 may have held for
the judge was settled by issuance of Marshall and Soto because, despite ample
opportunity and multiple arguments thereafter, the parties both failed to mention the rule.
Moreover, the prosecutor's request for reconsideration specifically pointed the trial judge
to footnote nine in Marshall, and defendant made no attempt to argue that it did not apply
to this case, establishing that the parties in fact believed that any issue with regard to rule
9-301 had been resolved and was not relevant to a decision on the motion to dismiss in
this case (R. 153-68). However, the judge accepted the parties' written memoranda, took
the matter under advisement, and thereafter sua sponte ruled on the issue without seeking
input from the parties. Even in the face of footnote nine, with no opposing argument
from defendant, the trial judge did not seek argument or input from defendant, but upheld
his prior ruling (R. 169). Add. C.
Hence, while the trial court sought oral argument on rule 9-301 at one point, the
timing and generality of the request, together with the events occurring thereafter, did not
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give the prosecutor either sufficient notice as to the trial judge's concern or any
meaningful opportunity for input on Rule 9-301.
Moreover, the lack of any meaningful opportunity for input is aggravated by the
fact that the judge faulted the State for an evidentiary failure: the failure to adduce
evidence the prosecutor did not know was needed on a point the prosecutor did not know
was at issue. Nothing at or before the evidentiary hearing alerted the prosecutor to the
need to adduce the requisite evidence. The trial court's numerous reassurances during the
evidentiary hearing that the burden of proof had shifted from the State to defendant,
leaving in place the presumption of regularity, prevented the prosecutor from discerning
any need for additional evidence. Thereafter, no other evidentiary opportunity occurred,
even if the prosecutor had some reason to believe rule 9-301 had any relevance after
issuance of the Marshall and Soto opinions.
The trial judge's attempt to distinguish Marshall leaves unchanged the fact the he
has done exactly what Marshall prohibits. Marshall is binding on the trial court. See
Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995) ("The Court of
Appeals has state-wide jurisdiction, and its rulings . . . are binding state-wide, whether
those rulings are constitutionally based or not.").
"The expeditious disposition of criminal business and the rendering of justice
require that courts be fair and reasonable not only to the defendant, but to the state and its
citizens, represented by the prosecutor, as well." State v. Gooding, 453 A.2d 774, 781
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(Conn. Supp. 1982). Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court
was not at liberty to raise the uncontested issue sua sponte and base its decision on that
issue without some specific notice to and a meaningful opportunity for input from the
parties. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 558, 567 (Al. App. 1988) (trial court erred in
unexpectedly resolving case on basis of a witness5 affidavit alone where neither party had
notice of the court's intent to take such action or an opportunity to respond to the
information in the affidavit); Gooding, 453 A.2d at 780-81 (by acting sua sponte without
notice to counsel or an opportunity to be heard, the trial court "denied a basic right to
each party to a fair hearing in a judicial proceeding" and "denied the state its
constitutional right to due process," rendering the action of the court illegal and void);
People v. Anderson, 817 N.E.2d 1000, 1008 (111. App. 2004), appeal pending (Jan. Term
2005) (courts may not "deny litigants notice and the opportunity to first be heard on the
issues raised by the court on its own motion"); Commonwealth v. Pachipko, 677 A.2d
1247, 1249-50 (Pa.Super 1996) (finding error in the trial court's grant of defendant's pretrial habeas petition based on an uncontested issue not raised by the parties and without
notice or an opportunity to the prosecution to defend), appeal den 'd 687 A.2d 377 (Pa.
1997); State v. Salinas, 975 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tx. App. 1998) (trial court erred in
dismissing case on a ground not timely raised where the State was not provided with prior
notice and a meaningful hearing on the issue); see also United States v. Rich, 589 F.2d
1025, 1033-34 (10th Cir.1978) (holding that trial court erred when, at a sua sponte status
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hearing, it allowed defendant to raise a speedy trial challenge summarily and dismissed
the case without prior notice to or opportunity to defend by the State).
Because the trial judge erroneously decided this matter, dismissal of the enhanced
charged amounts to an abuse of discretion and warrants remand for further proceedings.
C.

Regardless, the Absence of Proof That the Prior Pleas were in Fact
Involuntary Prevents Dismissal
Even if the judge could properly raise the issue sua sponte, it does not follow, on

these facts, that the absence of evidence of compliance with subsection (2)(B) establishes
that the pleas were, in fact, unknowing or involuntary. See Marshall, 2003 UT App 381,
121 n.9; see also Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993) (to prevail in a
collateral attack on a guilty plea, defendant must show that the guilty plea was in fact not
knowing and voluntary). Defendant claimed only that he was not informed of his right to
counsel and of the potential enhancements. The trial court rejected these claims and
found that defendant had told the Grand County Circuit Court judge he understood his
rights (R. 150). Add. B. The record also shows that defendant signed the
acknowledgment in Grand County (R. 186: 50). In the Emery County case, the record
shows that defendant told the court he understood English and that he understood his
rights after each was stated to him (R. 186: 21-22, 35). Defendant submitted no proof
below of any lack of understanding. Hence, even if one of the pleas did not comply with
rule 9-301(2)(B), dismissal is not warranted on these facts where defendant has not
established that his pleas were in fact unknowing or involuntary, as is required before a
21

collateral attack will work to invalidate the prior guilty pleas. See Marshall, 2003 UT
App 381, If 21 n.9; Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992.6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's order dismissing the felony charge against defendant and remand the matter
for further proceedings.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
This Court has discretion "to determine which matters require oral argument,
which decisions require a full opinion, and which do not." Grand County v. Rogers, 2002
UT 25, f 16. Here, the decisional process would be significantly aided by oral argument.
Cf. Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). In addition, this case presents a novel question of law.
Therefore, the State requests oral argument and a published opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /

clay of February, 2005.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney/General

[S C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General

6

If, arguendo, the failure to comply with subsection (2)(B) constituted proof of an
unknowing or involuntary plea, the fact remains that the evidence suggests that the
subsection was, in fact, complied with in each of the Justice Courts, and a remand is
necessary to provide the parties an opportunity to address the issue and adduce the forms
that bear on the issue.
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(b) The court may, as a n alternative to all or p a r t of a jail sentence,
require t h e person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less t h a n
240 hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(e) In addition to t h e jail sentence, compensatory-service work program,
or home confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order t h e person to participate in an educational series if t h e
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under
Subsection (5)(d); and
(hi) impose a fine of not less t h a n $800.
(d) The court m a y order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment
if t h e substance abuse treatment program determines t h a t substance
abuse t r e a t m e n t is appropriate.
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with
Subsection (14).
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony
if it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten
years of two or more prior convictions; or
(ii) a t any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 t h a t is committed after July 1, 2001; or
(B) a felony violation under this section t h a t is committed after
J u l y 1, 2001.
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of
this section.
(c) U n d e r Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall
impose:
(i) a fine of not less t h a n $1,500; and
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less t h a n 1,500 hours.
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring
t h e person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse
t r e a t m e n t a t a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive
care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised followthrough after t r e a t m e n t for not less t h a n 240 hours.
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which
m a y include requiring the person to participate in home confinement
t h r o u g h t h e use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection
(13).
• . (7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may
not be suspended and the convicted person is not 1 eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section h a s been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(8) (a) (i) T h e provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) t h a t require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate > in a
screening and assessment; and an educational'series; obtain, in the
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discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, m a n d a t o rily, substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things,
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45
under Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening a n d
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse t r e a t m e n t in
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction u n d e r
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or
subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), a n d (6).
(b) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to:
(i) complete all court ordered:
(A) screening and assessment;
(B) educational series;
(C) substance abuse treatment; and
(D) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution a n d treatment costs. Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend
the person's driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3221(2) and (3).
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted u n d e r
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a
substitute for, a n original charge of a violation of this section, t h e
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for t h e plea,
including whether or not there h a d been consumption of alcohol,
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection w i t h
the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts t h a t shows
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant, in connection with t h e violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting t h e plea
offered under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify t h e Driver License Division of each conviction
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when the officer h a s probable cause to believe the violation h a s
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer h a s probable cause to
believe t h a t the violation was committed by the person.
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted
for the first time under Subsection (2);
*
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of a n y
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) or if t h e person h a s a prior
conviction as defined under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a period of t e n years from the date of the prior violation;
and
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered'by t h e
court under Subsection (12).
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from a n y suspension or
revocation period the number of days for which a license w a s previously
suspended under Section 53-3^223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension
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Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
a combination of both or with specified or unsafe
blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of
blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment
— Arrest w i t h o u t warrant — Penalties — Susp e n s i o n or revocation of license.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless
driving under Subsections (9) and (10);
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled
substance t h a t is t a k e n illegally in the body;
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or
a combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance
with Section 41-6-43;
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (v), which
j u d g m e n t of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or
(vii) s t a t u t e s or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug,
or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this
state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; ±
(b) "educational series" m e a n s an educational series obtained a t a
substance abuse program t h a t is approved by the Board of Substance
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse
program t h a t is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental
Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily uiiury t h a t creates or causes
serious p e r m a n e n t disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death;
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse program t h a t is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse
and Mental H e a l t h in accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(f) "substance abuse t r e a t m e n t program" means a state licensed substance abuse program;
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordi^
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
and

(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to
exercise t h a t degree of care t h a t an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises u n d e r like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person m a y not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this s t a t e if the person:
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(i) h a s sufficient alcohol in his body t h a t a subsequent chemical test
shows t h a t the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater at the time of t h e test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree t h a t renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(iii) h a s a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control.
(b) The fact t h a t a person charged with violating this section is or h a s
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 milHUters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
'(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) h a s also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in t h e vehicle at t h e
time of the offense; or
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18
years of age in the vehicle a t the time of the offense.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon
«another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent
manner.
f
(4) (a) As p a r t of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less t h a n 48 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or p a r t of a jail sentence,
require t h e person, to:
'
'
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less t h a n
48 hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
3i
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program,
or home confinement, the court shall:
?
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the
court does not order substance abuse t r e a t m e n t as described under
Subsection (4)(d); and
(iii) impose a fine of not less t h a n $700.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment
if the substance abuse treatment program determines t h a t substance
abuse treatment is appropriate.
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14).
' (ii) If there is admissible evidence t h a t t h e ' p e r s o n had a blood
alcohol level of .16 or higher, t h e court shall order probation for the
person in accordance with Subsection (14).
• ,. * -} *
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a
'prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence
/impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less t h a n 240 consecutive hours.
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w a s based on t h e same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is
based.
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court
m a y order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those
persons who have shown they are safety hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this
Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for
a specified period of time.
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts.
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require:
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
(ii) t h a t a device be placed in the home or other specified location of
the person, so t h a t the person's compliance with the court's order may
be monitored; and
(iii) t h e person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other
specified location.
(d) The court may:
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a substance abuse testing instrument;
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during
the time the person is subject to home confinement;
(iii) set specific time and location conditions t h a t allow the person
to attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel
directly between those activities and the person's home; and
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement
if t h e person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider.
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers
by the court u n d e r Subsection (13)(d)(iv).
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or
Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e):
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation;
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and
(iii) t h e court may order any other conditions of the probation.
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation
provider.
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence,
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete t h a t
sentence or those conditions or orders.
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(d) (i) The court m a y waive all or p a r t of the costs associated w i t h
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall
cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i).
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and t h e r e is
admissible evidence t h a t the person h a d a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher,
then if the court does not order:
(a) t r e a t m e n t as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d), t h e n
the court shall enter the reasons on the record; and
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on t h e
record:
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943, May 1, 2000, substituted "a substance abuse
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, testing instrument" for "an alcohol detection
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, breathalyzer" in Subsection (13)(d)(i) and
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, added Subsection (14) (Subsection (15) in the
§ 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, reconciled version).
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46,
The 2000 amendment by ch. 334, effective
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29; May 1, 2000, rewrote the section, adding provi1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2; sions for educational series, substance abuse
1988, ch. 17, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 16; 1990, screenings and assessments, substance abuse
ch. 299, § 1; 1991, ch. 147, § 1; 1993, ch. 168, treatment programs, and supervised probation
§ 1; 1993, ch. 193, § 1; 1993, ch. 234, § 32; and added Subsection (14).
1994, ch. 159, § 1; 1994, ch. 263, § 1; 1996,
The 2001 amendment by ch. 64, effective
ch. 71, § 1; 1996, ch. 220, § 1; 1996, ch. 223, April 30, 2001, in Subsection (6)(a), added the
§ 2; 1997, ch. 68, § 1; 1998, ch. 13, § 46; 1998, (i) designation, deleted "third or subsequent"
ch. 94, § 1; 1998, ch. 168, § 1; 1999, ch. 33, before "conviction," substituted "violation of
§ 1; 1999, ch. 226, § 1; 1999, ch. 258, § 1; Subsection (2)" for "violation," added Subsec2000, ch. 333, § 1; 2000, ch. 334, § 1; 2001, tion (6)(a)(ii), and made stylistic changes.
ch. 64, § 1; 2001, ch. 289, § 1; 2001, ch. 309,
The 2001 amendment by ch. 289, effective
§ 1; 2001, ch. 355, § 1; 2002, ch. 8, § 1; 2002, April 30, 2001, made the same changes as ch.
ch.54,§ 1; 2002, ch. 106, § 1; 2002 (5th S.S.), 64 and also substituted "ten years" for "six
ch. 8, § 10.
years" in Subsections (5Xa), (6)(a)(i), and
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- (llXaXii).
ment by ch 226, effective May 3, 1999, deleted
The 2001 amendment by ch. 355, effective
Subsection (6)(aXi), making class A misdemean- April 30, 2001, in Subsection (4)(e), added "(i)
ors an alternative classification; deleted Sub- Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii)" and
sections (6)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), relating to three added Subsection (4)(e)(ii) and in Subsection
and two prior convictions, respectively; deleted (14)(a) added the reference to Section 41-6-44.6.
former Subsection (6)(b), relating to fines, jail
The 2001 amendment by ch. 309, effective
sentences, and alternatives to jail sentences; July 1, 2001, added Subsection (3)(a)(ii)(C) and
inserted "or 53-3-231" in Subsection (ll)(b); and inserted "or two years" in Subsection (12)(a).
made designation and stylistic changes.
The 2002 amendment by ch. 8, effective May
The 1999 amendment by ch. 258, effective 6, 2002, redesignated former Subsection (l)(a)
May 3,1999, rewrote Subsection (2)(a)(i), which as Subsection (l)(b), and former Subsection
read "has a blood or breath alcohol concentra- (l)(b) as (IXa), substituting "conviction" for
tion of .08 grams or greater as shown by a "prior conviction"; added Subsections (l)(a)(iii)
chemical test given within two hours after the and (l)(a)(vi), redesignating subsections acalleged operation or physical control," and cordingly; in Subsection (6), added Subsection
made stylistic changes.
(b), making related and stylistic changes; added
The 1999 amendment by ch. 33, effective July "or if the person has a prior conviction as
1, 1999, added Subsections (4)(b)(ii) and denned under Subsection (1)" in Subsection
(5)(b)(ii), making related changes; inserted "or (ll)(a)(ii); and substituted "alcohol, any drug,
home confinement" in Subsections (4)(c) and or combination of both-related" for "alcohol(5)(c); added Subsections (6)(d) (Subsection related" throughout.
(6)(c) in the reconciled version) and (13); and
The 2002 amendment by ch. 54, effective May
made related changes throughout the section
6, 2002, substituted "48 hours" for "24 hours" in
The 2000 amendment by ch. 333, effective Subsection (4)(b)(i); substituted "if the court

ARTICLE 3. CRIMINAL PRACTICE
R U L E 9-301. RECORD OF ARRAIGNMENT AND CONVICTION
Intent:
To establish a procedure for justice courts to follow in making a record at the
time of arraignment and conviction in those cases where the defendant may be
subject to an enhanced penalty if convicted of the same offense in the future.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the justice courts in those cases where the defendant may
be subject to an enhanced penalty if convicted of the same offense in the future.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) At the time of arraignment, the justice court judge shall determine whether
the defendant would be subject to an enhanced penalty if convicted of the same
offense in the future.
(2) If the defendant would be subject to an enhanced penalty, upon the entry of a
plea of guilty, the justice court judge shall:
(A) Advise the defendant, orally and in writing of the defendant's rights, the
elements of the charged offense, the penalties for the charged offense, and the
enhancement penalty which may be imposed in the event the defendant is
convicted of the same offense in the future; and
(B) Require the defendant to sign a statement acknowledging that the defendant understands his rights and that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
waives those rights.
(3) Upon the entry of a guilty plea or receipt of a conviction, the justice court
judge shall execute a written and signed judgment of conviction and forward the
appropriate information and/or fingerprints to the state agencies responsible for
maintaining criminal records.

Addendum B

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN ANID
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

vs.
Case No,
ABIGAIL FLORES GONZALES
Defendant

021700135

Judge Bruce K. Halliday

Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss Third Degree Felony on
November 18,2002. On December 5,2002, the defendant filed a Motion for Hearing along with
a Notice of Motion also regarding the Motion to Dismiss. The State filed an objection to
defendant's Motion to Dismiss on January 7, 2003. Defendant, by and through counsel of
record, filed a second Memorandum Regarding Motion to Dismiss by FAX on January 8,2003,
the original being filed on January 10, 2003. The Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's
Second Memorandum to Dismiss on January 21, 2003.
At the preliminary hearing scheduled on October 16, 2002, both counsel indicated that
a Motion to Dismiss would be forth coming and that the disposition of that Motion to Dismiss may
vitiate the need for a trial. The Court, at the scheduled preliminary hearing date of October
16th, scheduled written memorandums in this matter to befiledby defense counsel by November 18,
2002. The State's response thereto to befiledby December 18,2002, and defense counsel then had4
until January 2, 2003, to file a reply. The Court notes the disparity between scheduled and actual
filings herein. The Court in response to Defendant's Motion for Hearing scheduled an evidentiary
hearing to be held on January 28,2003. The evidentiary hearing was held on said date and the Court
took under advisement the motion in order to read the case law suggested by counsel.
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Having now reviewed the case law as well as the pleadings herein, the Court finds as follows:
The state of Utah had marked for identification and offered as exhibits 1 and 2 respectively herein the
certified copies of the Emery County Justice Court, Green River Division judgement of February 14,
2001, and of the Grand County Justice Court judgement of September 15, 1997. Upon receipt of
those documents by the Court, the state suggested that it was then up to the defendant to raise
questions as to the propriety or impropriety of the prior proceedings and it was the burden of the
defendant to establish the impropriety of the prior proceedings by some evidence, at which time the
burden would re-shift to the state to show that proper procedures were adhered to by a
preponderance of the evidence. The defendant, rather than offering specific evidence on the state's
errors, chose to call the two Justice Court Judges as witnesses to show non-compliance. The Court,
in an attempt to economize the judicial time necessary, allowed leeway on the part of both parties in
their examination and/or cross examination of the witnesses so that they need not be recalled unless,
after the defendant testified, the state wished to rebut any or all of the defendant's statements.
Having heard all of the testimony of the Justice Court Judges as well as the defendant in the
above entitled matter I conclude that the State has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant waived his right to counsel in both proceedings before the two Justice Court Judges.
The defendant only proved that he was not represented by counsel in either case. From his testimony
there was at least an inference that he did not waive counsel. The inference arisingfromhis testimony
that he didn't remember either judge advising him of a right to counsel, or asking whether he waived
such right as well as the alleged (his testimony) shortness of time (10 minutes) he remembered the
whole process took in front of Judge Burnes.
The Court believes that I must address Sua Sponte the question of compliance by the Justice
Court Judges with Rule 9-301, URJA. Neither Judge had evidence of a written advisory ofrights and

enhancement possibilities required under Rule 9-301 (2)(A), Judge Cox's policy was to give such
written notice to defendant, but to destroy evidence thereof upon completion of each case, only
retaining the Citation, Information and Judgement. His testimony did not confirm what he specifically
did in this case, nor should we expect such specific memory after such a long time.
Judge Burnes said no copy of a Written Notice was in thefileso she thought one had not been
given defendant although she had forms (as did Judge Cox) that made such explanations. Counsel
reviewed these forms and I believe defense counsel referred to language therein in her examination
of her client. However, neither counsel offered the forms as exhibits herein.
I agree with Judge Bryner's decision in State of Utah vs. Jose Luis Telles, 021700133,
especially, that the Judicial Council meant for the failure of compliance with the Rule to have some
consequence. I therefore urge Justice Courts to issue and retain copies of such document(s).
However, they are only evidence of compliance. Judge Cox testimony preponderates that compliance
occurred. Judge Burnes testimony creates some doubt about compliance. Although no copy was in
file; her specific recollections convince the Court that plaintiff was advised about his rights and
enhancements. However, since the forms were not offered, and I don't know whether the forms
have provision for defendant's signature, I cannot conclude anything about the adequacy of the form
to comply with Rule 9-301(2)(B) URJA.
I conclude therefore that in this case the State did not meet its burden of proving compliance
with Rule 9-301 URJA and therefore the prior judgements may not be used to enhance the
punishments and/or degree of offense provided for by multiple convictions under Utah Law.
The Motion to Dismiss is therefore granted and the case as charged dismissed no prejudice
to the State should Attach and the State mayfilea lesser offense if it feels same is justified herein.
The Court has heard testimony by the Judges of their normal procedures and to the best of

their recollection the actual procedure followed with this defendant.
I also heard this defendant's testimony that when the first conviction occurred in Moab, he
was more deficient in his language skills than presently but, he could not say whether or not counsel
was offered or whether he waived counsel. The procedure that the Moab Justice testified to
convinces the Court that the defendant was, in fact, advised of his constitutional rights, that at the
time of entering his plea he was asked if he understood and indicated to the Judge that he did
understand at which time the Judge went forward with the imposition of sentence therein. The Justice
in the Green River case also testified as to her normal procedure as well as her specific recollection
with regard to this defendant. Her specific recollection was that he appeared with another individual
not during her normal arraignment, and that she specifically recalls asking this defendant about his
constitutional rights and delineated the procedure which she normally went through and to which she
recalled going through with this defendant.
The defendant's testimony, to some extent, contradicts the Judge's recollection, in that he
claims that a very short period of time was all that was needed for the Judge to go through the
procedure. He further claimed that he and his friend arrived on the day of the normal arraignment
calendar but after the time that was originally set. This partially confirms the Judge's recollection,
but does not substantiate the specific recollection of the Judge that she, on this particular occasion,
went through the arraignment procedure specifically with this defendant since he claims that it was
such a short period of time that the Judge took with him in accomplishing the entry of plea,
sentencing, and making provision for time payments. Both Judges testified that it was and is the
policy of each Judge at the time of imposing sentence to advise the defendant that subsequent
convictions could be used to enhance the penalties which might be imposed in the event that similar
changes were incurred in the future.

That specific aspect of their testimony was again only
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inferentially controverted by the defendant's testimony as to the shortness of the arraignment, plea,
and sentencing which took place before the Green River Justice Court Judge Both the presumption
of regularity and the evidence preponderates to the contrary and I would normally deny the Motion
to Dismiss but for the Rule 9-301 alluded to earlier.
This Court further concludes that the records of a "non Record Court" are nevertheless
records available to the prosecution and others as evidence of elements of the subsequently charged
violation/enhancement, see Judge Bryner's decision in State vs. Telles, Supra. The requested relief
relative to this issue is therefore denied.
Although the ruling herein is limited to this case the Court requests counsel for the state to
consider the application of Rule 9-301 on case #01170054. State vs Mario Soto, and whether the
evidence/forms, etc, will preponderate in favor of the state or defendant.
Dated this

day of July, 2004.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a signed copy of the foregoing RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS on the j 4 & day of July, 2004, to the following:
David A Blackweli, Emery County Attorney, PO Box 249, Castle Dale, UT 84513
Margret Sidwell Taylor, Attorney at Law, 20 S Main Street, Helper, UT 84526

Clerk/Depirfy) Court Clerk
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Addendum C

David A. Blackwell (4542)
Emery County Attorney
W. Brent Langston (4614)
Deputy Emery County Attorney
PO Box 249
Castle Dale, UT 84513
Telephone: (435)381-2543
Fax: (435)381-2735

FILED
JUL 1 5 2004
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Plaintiff;
vs.

Criminal No. 021700135

ABIGAIL FLORES GONZALES

Judge Bruce K. Halliday

DOB:

CA No. 02-0892

08/26/1974
Defendant.

COMES NOW W. Brent Langston, Deputy Emery County Attorney, and asks the Court to
reconsider its ruling in this matter in light of the express ruling to the contrary in State v. Marshall.
Specifically, the defendant in that case raised the issue of the applicability of Rule 9-301, Utah Code
of Judicial Administration, to the enhancement issue. In that case, as in Gonzales, the State had no
written record of strict compliance with the Rule. Footnote 9 of the Marshall case specifically
addressed defendant's due process claim and stated, "Even assuming defendant did plead guilty to
the charges culminating in his prior DUI convictions, it does not follow that those pleas would be
invalidated for enhancement purposes based solely on a failure to comply with Rule 9-301 of the
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Utah Code of Judicial Administration." The footnote goes on to explain the reasons why a failure
to notify defendant of possible future enhancements does not invalidate his guilty plea. In light of
the ruling in Marshall, which is directly on point and in view of the Court's ruling that, "Both the
presumption of regularity and the evidence preponderates to the contrary, and I would normally deny
the Motion to Dismiss but for the Rule 9-301 alluded to earlier." The only logical and reasonable
conclusion is that the Court was unaware that Marshall settled the issue of the applicability of Rule
9-301. The Supreme Court declined to accept certiorari on Marshall so the matter is final, and this
Court has no authority to overrule a higher court.
WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests the Court reconsider its ruling and issue a
ruling on compliance with the Marshall case denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this / A ^ ^ y o f J u l y , 2004.

r. BR£NT LANGSTC
Deputy Emery County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

jj$

day of July, 2004 a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Motion was mailed to:
Margret Sidwell Taylor
Attorney at Law
20 South Main
Helper, UT 84526

Secretary
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
gARBOff EMERY, STATE OF UTAH

9
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SEVRP D'STRICT COURTS

h
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

YS.

Case No. 021700135

ABIGAIL FLORES GONZALES
Defendant.

Judge Bruce K. Halliday

The State of Utah by W. Brent Langston, Deputy Emery County Attorney, has filed a
Motion to Reconsider the Court's ruling on defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed herein, suggesting
herein that the Court of Appeals decision and specifically footnote 9, in the case of State of Utah vs.
Jerry Lynn Marshall is determinative of the Court's concern expressed in the ruling on Motion to
Dismiss. Specifically that Rule 9-301 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration if not complied
with would preclude the state from using any convictions in those cases of non-compliance for
purposes of enhancement going forward. The Court, after reviewing the footnote, and without the
benefit of argument by counsel, has concluded that the "direct vs. collateral" dichotomy is useful
with respect to courts of record, but I believe that the judicial council in promulgating the rule had
in mind the distinction between Justice Courts and Courts of Record, and expected compliance with
that rule, and I believe they anticipated consequences of non-compliance. The Court has concluded
in this case that the state failed to prove compliance and therefore I am left with determining what
consequences non-compliance should have. My determination is that non-compliance with the rule
should have the effect of preventing the state from using any conviction before a Justice of the Peace
Court where the evidence does not show by a preponderance that the rule was in fact complied with.
I note that the rule provides for oral and written specifics and further a signature of the defendant.
In the case before this Court, to wit the Gonzales case, the state failed to prove that compliance and
therefore the Court ordered the dismissal and after review confirms that decision as of this date.
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Dated this 6th day of August, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

Bruce K. Halliday, Ju<
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the [(p— day of August, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Mr. David A. Blackwell, Emery County Attorney, PO Box 249, Castle Dale, UT 84513
Ms. Margret Sidwell Taylor, Attorney at Law, 20 S. Main, Helper, UT 84526
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/
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I /CourtClerk
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81 P.3d 775, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 55,2003 UT App 381
(Cite as: 81 P.3d 775,2003 UT App 381)
H
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jerry Lynn MARSHALL, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20020829-CA.
Nov. 14, 2003.
Background: Defendant was convicted on his
conditional plea of no contest in the District Court,
Castle Dale Department, Bryce K. Bryner, J., of
felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI),
based on enhancement due to two prior DUI
convictions. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held
that:
(1) enhancement of defendant's current DUI
conviction based on his prior DUI convictions did
not violate his rights under Ex Post Facto clause of
Federal Constitution, and
(2) defendant was not entitled to specific notice at
time of his prior DUI convictions that those
offenses could be used to enhance his current DUI
conviction to third degree felony.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law €^>1130(5)
1 lOkl 130(5) Most Cited Cases
[1] Criminal Law €=>1134(3)
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals would not separately analyze
defendant's due process and ex post facto claims
under State Constitution, in prosecution for felony
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), as
there was no distinction between protection against
ex post facto laws provided by State and Federal
Constitutions, and defendant failed to adequately set
forth any separate legal analysis under due process
provision of State Constitution. U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

[2] Criminal Law €=>l 134(3)
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
The propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or
deny a motion to dismiss is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness.
[3] Criminal Law €=^1134(3)
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
Whether legislation violates the ex post facto clause
of the Federal Constitution is a question of law,
which appellate court reviews for correctness,
giving the trial court no deference. U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
[4] Criminal Law €==>1134(3)
110k 1134(3) Most Cited Cases
Constitutional arguments regarding due process
present questions of law that appellate court reviews
for correctness. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[5] Constitutional Law €=^203
92k203 Most Cited Cases
[5] Sentencing and Punishment €^>1217
350Hkl217 Most Cited Cases
Enhancement of defendant's current conviction for
driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI)
based on his prior DUI convictions did not violate
his rights under Ex Post Facto clause of Federal
Constitution; DUI repeat offender statute did not
retroactively aggravate crimes of defendant's prior
DUIs, nor did it inflict a greater punishment than
that attached to those crimes when they were
committed, defendant's current conviction punished
him only for current offense, albeit more seriously
that if he would have committed same offense at
earlier point in time, and statute did not operate
retroactively. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44(6)(a), 68-3-3.
[6] Sentencing and Punishment €^>1361
350Hkl361 Most Cited Cases
Defendant was not entitled to specific notice at time
of his prior convictions for driving under the
influence of alcohol (DUI) that those offenses could
be used to enhance his current DUI conviction to
third degree felony, and thus defendant's due
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process right to notice was not violated; it was
unclear whether procedural rule requiring notice to
defendant of penalty enhancement possibilities
upon entry of guilty plea applied outside context of
determining validity of plea, defendant provided no
citations to record to support argument that he was
not advised of possibility of enhancement at time of
prior convictions, and notice to which defendant
claimed he was entitled would have been impossible
to give. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; U.C.A.1953,
41-6- 44(6)(a); Judicial Administration Rule
9-301(2).
[7] Constitutional Law €=^253(4)
92k253(4) Most Cited Cases
A violation of the prohibition against ex post facto
laws necessarily implicates due process concerns, as
an individual is deprived of fair notice when the
legislature increases punishment beyond what was
proscribed when the crime was consummated.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
[8] Constitutional Law €==>251.6
92k251.6 Most Cited Cases
[8] Constitutional Law €=>258(2)
92k258(2) Most Cited Cases
Due process requires, at a minimum, adequate and
timely notice; this means that a criminal statute
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to it what conduct on their part will render
them liable to its penalties. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
14.
[9] Criminal Law €^>273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
For a plea to be knowing and voluntary, an accused
must be fully aware of the direct consequences of a
guilty plea.
[10] Criminal Law €==>273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
If the consequence flowing from the plea is
collateral, then defendant need not be informed of it
before entering the plea; a "collateral consequence"
is one that is not related to the length or nature of
the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea.
*776 Margret Sidwell Taylor, Helper, and W.
Andrew McCullough, McCullough & Assoc,
Midvale, for Appellant.
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Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Kris C. Leonard,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before JACKSON, P. J., BENCH and ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
**1 Defendant was charged with felony DUI
based on enhancement due to two prior DUI
convictions. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss
the felony DUI charge, arguing that the
enhancement provision in the DUI statute was
unconstitutional as applied to him because it
violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
The trial court denied his motion. Defendant
appeals, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
**2 The parties stipulated to the facts governing
this appeal. On April 26, 2002, Defendant
purchased a twelve-pack of beer at BK's
convenience store in Huntington, Utah. The
transaction was witnessed by another customer,
Sergeant Gayle Jensen of the Emery County
Sheriffs Department, who noticed that Defendant
appeared to be intoxicated. Sergeant Jensen told
Defendant not to drive and suggested that he call a
friend to pick him up. The Defendant placed a
phone *777 call, and Sergeant Jensen left. Soon
after, however, Sergeant Jensen decided to return to
BK's to ensure that Defendant did not drive. Upon
his return to BK's, Sergeant Jensen observed
Defendant drive away. Sergeant Jensen stopped
Defendant, conducted field sobriety tests, and
concluded that Defendant was intoxicated.
Defendant was arrested and given an intoxilyzer
test, which showed a blood alcohol concentration of
.25, more than three times the legal limit in Utah.
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6- 44(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2003)
. An open container of alcohol was also found in
Defendant's vehicle.
**3 Defendant was charged by information with
driving under the influence of alcohol and having an
open alcoholic beverage container in a motor
vehicle. Because two or more of Defendant's nine
prior DUI convictions fell within ten years of his
April 2002 arrest, Defendant's DUI charge was
enhanced from a class B misdemeanor to a third
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degree felony pursuant to the 2001 amendment to
the DUI statute. See Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44(3)(a)(i), (6)(a)(i) (Supp.2002). Pursuant to
that amendment, effective April 30, 2001, a DUI
conviction is a third degree felony if it occurs
"within ten years of two or more prior [DUI]
convictions." Id. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i). Prior to the
2001 amendment, the felony enhancement provision
applied to a third conviction within six years. See
id. §41-6-44(6)(a)(Supp.l999).
**4 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the felony
DUI charge. First, Defendant argued that
enhancement of the offense violated his due process
rights because in 1995 and 1998, when his prior
DUI convictions were entered, he was not given
"notice of the consequences of any future violation"
and "could not have ... foreseen that in the year
2001 the Utah State Legislature would pass a law
by which his [prior] convictions would be used to
enhance th[e current DUI] charge to a third degree
felony." Second, Defendant argued that the 2001
amendment could not be applied retroactively;
thus, any offense committed prior to its enactment
could not be used against him for enhancement
purposes as that would violate the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws.
**5 The trial court rejected Defendant's ex post
facto argument, concluding that "[t]he 2001
amendment does not affect the status of the
previous offenses or convictions and does not
increase their severity or penalty." Rather, the court
held, the 2001 amendment merely "gives a more
severe penalty [for the present offense] because of
the prior convictions."
**6 As for Defendant's due process argument, the
trial court noted that Defendant had nearly one
year's notice that the enhancement provision had
been amended. Thus, Defendant was on notice as
of April 30, 2001, the effective date of the 2001
amendment, [FN1] "that if he committed a DUI
after that date, his charge could be enhanced by any
DUI convictions within a [ten] year period prior to
the latest offense." Thus, the trial court concluded
that application of the 2001 amendment to his 2002
offense did not violate Defendant's rights on either
ex post facto or due process grounds and denied
Defendant's motion to dismiss.

FN1. The trial court mistakenly noted, as
does the State on appeal, that the effective
date of the 2001 amendment was July 1,
2001; however, the amendment actually
went into effect April 30, 2001. See Utah
Motor
Vehicle
Act,
ch. 289, §
41-6-44(6)(a), 2001 Utah Laws 1349,
1350; amendment notes, Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44
(Supp.2003).
Because
Defendant's DUI arrest occurred on April
26, 2002, Defendant had nearly one year's
notice of the 2001 amendment.
**7 With the trial court's approval, Defendant
thereafter entered a conditional plea of no contest,
reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial
of his motion to dismiss the third degree felony DUI
charge. See generally State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935,
938-39 (Utah Ct.App.1988). In exchange for his no
contest plea, the State dropped the open container
charge.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2][3][4] **8 We must determine whether the
trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to
dismiss on the basis that the 2001 amendment to the
DUI statute violates neither the due process nor ex
post facto provisions *778 of the United States
Constitution. [FN2] "[T]he propriety of a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss
is a question of law that we review for correctness."
Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996).
"[W]hether legislation violates the ex post facto
clause [ ] of the ... United States Constitution ] is
also a question of law, which we review for
correctness, giving the trial court no deference."
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2,1f 37, 40 P.3d 611.
Likewise, "constitutional arguments regarding ...
due process present questions of law" that we
review for correctness. State v. One 1980 Cadillac,
2001 UT 26,1 8, 21 P.3d 212. Accord State v.
Frausto, 2002 UT App 259,^ 14, 53 P.3d 486,
cert, denied, 63 P.3d 104 (Utah 2002).
FN2. As we " 'recognizef ] no distinction
between the protection against ex post
facto laws provided by the Utah and the
United States Constitutions,' " State v.
Daniels, 2002 UT 2,f 42, 40 P.3d 611
(citations omitted in original), and as
Defendant "has not adequately set forth
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any separate legal analysis" under the due
process
provisions
of
the
Utah
Constitution, State v. Davis, 972 P.2d 388,
392 (Utah 1998), we do not separately
analyze Defendant's state constitutional
claims.
ANALYSIS
[5] **9 Defendant renews his ex post facto and
due process arguments on appeal, i.e., Defendant
argues that enhancement of his current DUI offense
based on his prior DUI convictions violated his
rights under the ex post facto and due process
clauses of the United States Constitution. We now
consider each of Defendant's arguments.
I. Ex Post Facto
**10 "Article I, § 10, of the Constitution prohibits
the States from passing any 'ex post facto Law.' "
California Dep't ofCorr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,
504, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995)
. The United States Supreme Court has consistently
identified four types of criminal laws that fall within
the ex post facto prohibition:
"1st. Every law that makes an action done before
the passing of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes
it greater than it was, when committed.
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the crime, when committed.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the
offender''
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 522, 120 S.Ct.
1620, 1627, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000) (quoting
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1
L.Ed. 648 (1798)) (emphasis in original). Accord
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2,<f 44, 40 P.3d 611.
The first and fourth categories are inapplicable
here. Therefore, with a view to the second and third
categories, we must decide whether the 2001
amendment to the DUI law retroactively "
'aggravates' " Defendant's prior DUI crimes or "
'inflicts a greater punishment' " than that attached to
the crimes when they were committed. Id. (citation
and emphasis omitted). We therefore turn our
attention to our statutory DUI scheme and the 2001

amendment in particular.
**11 As stated above, two of Defendant's nine
prior DUIs were used to enhance his tenth and
current DUI offense to a third degree felony. The
two prior DUI convictions relevant to this appeal
occurred in December 1995 and September 1998.
Our DUI statute has been amended numerous times
over the years, reflecting society's increased
intolerance for repeat DUI offenders. For example,
at the time of Defendant's 1995 offense, &'fourth
DUI conviction was a third degree felony if
committed within six years of the prior violations
and if those violations occurred after April 23,
1990. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(7)(a) (1993).
At the time of Defendant's 1998 offense, however, a
third DUI conviction was a third degree felony if
committed within six years of the prior violations
and if those violations occurred after July 1, 1996.
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (1998).
**12 In 1999, the Legislature deleted the date
restriction contained in previous versions of the
statute; therefore, a third DUI *779 conviction was
a third degree felony if committed within six years
of the prior violations, regardless of when those
violations occurred. See Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44(6)(a) (Supp.1999). Finally, in 2001, the
Legislature amended the statute again, lengthening
the time frame in which prior DUIs could be used
for enhancement purposes from six to ten years. See
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6- 44(6)(a) (Supp.2001).
Thus, under the 2001 version of the statute-the
version under which Defendant was most recently
convicted—a third DUI conviction is a third degree
felony if committed within ten years of two prior
DUI convictions, regardless of when those prior
convictions occurred. See id.
**13 Defendant argues that the 2001 amendment,
as applied to him, constitutes a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws
because it takes into account offenses committed
before its enactment for purposes of enhancement.
As a way of avoiding the felony enhancement
provision of the 2001 statute, Defendant urges us to
graft the cut-off date of the 1998 version of the
statute onto the current version. Thus, under
Defendant's view, the 2001 DUI statute should be
read to allow felony enhancement only if Defendant
was convicted of a third DUI within ten years of the
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prior DUIs, and only if those DUIs occurred after
July 1, 1996. [FN3] But see Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (Supp.2001) (containing no cut-off
date and stating simply M[a DUI] conviction ... is a
third degree felony if it is committed ... within ten
years of two or more prior convictions under this
section"). Of course, using the July 1, 1996 cut-off
date would mean that Defendant's December 1995
DUI conviction could not be used to enhance his
current DUI offense, for which he was convicted on
October 1, 2002. We decline to adopt Defendant's
peculiar interpretation of the 2001 statute, however,
because we find no constitutional infirmity under
the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution.
FN3.
This
position
is
inherently
inconsistent with Defendant's general
argument, which is that the 2001
amendment is an ex post facto law because
it takes into account offenses committed
before its enactment for purposes of
enhancement. If, as Defendant suggests, a
statute is rendered constitutionally infirm if
it "looks back" to offenses committed
before its enactment, such infirmity would
not be cured by looking back only six
years instead often.
**14 The United States Supreme Court has
consistently upheld the constitutionality of recidivist
statutes, explaining that "[a]n enhanced sentence
imposed on a persistent offender ... 'is not to be
viewed as [an] additional penalty for the earlier
crimes' but as 'a stiffened penalty for the latest
crime, which is considered to be an aggravated
offense because a repetitive one.' " Monge v.
California, 524 U.S. 721, 728, 118 S.Ct. 2246,
2250, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998) (quoting Gryger v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 1258, 92
L.Ed. 1683 (1948)). See also Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738, 747, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1927,
128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994) ("Enhancement statutes,
whether in the nature of criminal history provisions
... or recidivist statutes that are commonplace in
state criminal laws, do not change the penalty
imposed for the earlier conviction.... '[T]his Court
consistently has sustained repeat-offender laws as
penalizing only the last offense committed by the
defendant.' ") (citation omitted); Parke v. Raley,
506 U.S. 20, 26-27, 113 S.Ct. 517, 521-22, 121

L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (noting that "[s]tatutes that
punish recidivists more severely than first offenders
have a long tradition in this country that dates back
to colonial times"; "[s]uch laws currently are in
effect in all 50 States"; "[s]tates have a valid
interest in deterring and segregating habitual
criminals"; and "we have repeatedly upheld
recidivism statutes 'against contentions that they
violate constitutional strictures dealing with double
jeopardy, ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual
punishment, due process, equal protection, and
privileges and immunities' ") (quoting Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560, 87 S.Ct. 648, 651, 17
L.Ed.2d 606 (1967)) (other citations omitted). [FN4]
FN4. Some of the United States Supreme
Court cases we cite here are not
necessarily pristine ex post facto cases, but
they nevertheless apply by analogy.
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 118
S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998), for
example, was a double jeopardy case, but
its reasoning is applicable here, where
Defendant
argues
that
the
2001
amendment operates to punish him (again)
for conduct that occurred before its
enactment. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,
123 S.Ct. 1140, 1149, 155 L.Ed.2d 164
(2003) (noting relationship between ex
post
facto
and
double
jeopardy
jurisprudence).
*780 **15 While Utah appellate courts have not
had occasion to rule on the constitutionality of the
2001 amendment to the DUI statute in the face of
an ex post facto challenge, [FN5] the Utah Supreme
Court has upheld recidivist statutes under analogous
circumstances. One such case is particularly
instructive. In Zeimer v. Turner, 14 Utah 2d 232,
381 P.2d 721 (1963), the defendant challenged his
conviction as a habitual criminal, stemming from
violations occurring in 1949 and 1955. See id. at
722. Like Utah's DUI statute, the habitual criminal
statute had been amended to allow for stiffer
penalties for recidivists. See id. at 722-23. Under
the 1950 version of the statute, the defendant's 1949
offense could not be considered in determining his
status as a habitual criminal, but under the 1951
version, it could. See id. The defendant argued that
his conviction under the 1951 version of the statute
was illegal, as it took into account an offense that
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occurred before its enactment. See id. at 723. The
Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument,
explaining that
FN5. Numerous other jurisdictions have
rejected ex post facto challenges to
enhancement statutes that take into account
prior DUI convictions. See State v.
Yellowmexican, 142 Ariz. 205, 688 P.2d
1097, 1099 (Ct.App.1984) (citing cases
from other jurisdictions and stating that
"[e]nhanced punishment statutes for repeat
offenders have been consistently upheld
against arguments that they violate ex post
facto proscriptions" and holding that, in
the case before it, "[t]he punishment
imposed under
[the Arizona DWI
recidivist statute] is based on the third
DWI [and] does not increase the penalty
for the [two] prior convictions"), approved
en banc by 142 Ariz. 91, 688 P.2d 983
(1984); Roberts v. State, 494 A.2d 156,
157 (Del. 1985) (holding that
"the
mandatory sentencing provision of the
statute is not an ex post facto law as it
applies to this defendant, since the
enhanced punishment could be invoked
only after a second offense, and, in this
case, the second offense took place after
the statute had been amended"); Botkin v.
Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 292, 295
(Ky.1994) (rejecting defendants' ex post
facto challenge and holding, "[h]ere the
offenders are not being punished for
crimes committed prior to the effective
date of the [enhancement] statute, but for a
crime committed thereafter, albeit they
received a greater punishment by reason of
their status as prior offenders for other
driving under the influence offenses");
Bailey v. State, 728 So.2d 1070, 1074
(Miss. 1997)
(upholding
enhancement
statute and stating: "The statute regarding
third-offense DUI charges has not been
changed such that [defendant] would be
receiving a stronger punishment than that
enumerated in the statute at the time
[defendant] committed his third DUI [;] ...
therefore, the ex post facto analysis is
inapplicable."); State v. Brander, 280
Mont. 148, 930 P.2d 31, 35 (1996)

(rejecting defendant's ex post facto
challenge and stating that "the increase in
punishment at issue here is a consequence
of [defendant's] present offense only and
this enhancement neither punishes any
previous conduct nor increases the penalty
for any prior conviction of DUI[; rather,]
the enhancement of [defendant's] present
DUI to felony status is nothing more nor
less than current punishment for his
repetitive drunk driving offense"); State v.
Hansen, 258 Neb. 752, 605 N.W.2d 461,
464 (2000) (upholding
enhancement
statute and stating: "In the instant case,
[defendant] is not receiving additional
punishment for his previous convictions,
but he is being penalized under the newly
amended statutory scheme for persisting in
committing the offense of DUI."); State v.
Edwards, 302 S.C. 492, 397 S.E.2d 88, 89
(1990) (rejecting defendant's argument
"that the legislature did not intend for the
1988 amendment to apply 'retroactively' to
allow consideration of his 1983 conviction
[in determining the degree of his current
DUI offense]" because "the clear and
unambiguous language of the amendment
indicates that the new 10 year period is to
be used in determining the degree of any
DUI committed on or after January 1,
1989").
[t]he habitual criminal statute will apply only
upon a conviction of the criminal offense last
charged. Its invocation does not inflict additional
or further punishment for the prior convictions or
impose a new punishment therefor. It only serves
to make more severe the punishment for the last
or subsequent offense which might be imposed
because of the previous convictions.
Our habitual criminal statute does not require that
the prior convictions of an accused be subsequent
to its enactment or amendments thereto. It has
been generally held that a state may enact such
statutes that would consider and apply
convictions occurring prior to their enactment.
Id at 723-24 (citations omitted). Cf State v.
Coleman, 540 P.2d 953, 953-54 (Utah 1975)
(holding that defendant, who was "convicted of
assault with a deadly weapon in the year 1969,"
could lawfully be charged with "possession of a
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dangerous weapon by a convicted person" because
the latter offense occurred *781 after the applicable
statute was enacted in 1973, and because "[t]he
statute ... only has prospective application and in no
way affects the 1969 conviction").
**16 In the instant case, the 2001 amendment does
not retroactively " 'aggravate[ ]' " the crimes of
Defendant's 1995 and 1998 DUIs, nor does it "
'inflict[ ] a greater punishment1 " than that attached
to those crimes when they were committed.
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 522, 120 S.Ct.
1620, 1627, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000) (quoting
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1
L.Ed. 648 (1798)) (emphasis omitted). Accord
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2,1f 44, 40 P.3d 611.
The 2001 amendment went into effect April 30,
2001, see supra note 1, and Defendant committed
the current DUI offense on April 26, 2002.
Defendant's current conviction punishes him only
for the April 2002 offense, albeit more seriously
than if he would have committed the same offense
at an earlier point in time. For these reasons,
Defendant's ex post facto challenge is unavailing.
[FN6]
FN6. We reject Defendant's argument
under Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000) for
the same reasons. Section 68-3-3 states:
"No part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared."
The 2001 amendment does not operate
retroactively; therefore, it comports with
section 68-3-3.
II. Due Process
[6][7][8] **17 We now address the separate but
closely related issue of whether application of the
2001
amendment
violated
Defendant's
constitutional right to due process. [FN7] "Due
process requires, at a minimum, adequate and
timely notice." In re McCully, 942 P.2d 327, 332
(Utah 1997). This means that a criminal statute
must be " 'sufficiently explicit to inform those who
are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties.' " Bouie v.
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351, 84 S.Ct 1697, 1701,
12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) (quoting Connally v.
General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct.
126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)).

FN7. A violation of the prohibition against
ex post facto laws necessarily implicates
due process concerns, as an individual is
deprived of "fair notice ... when the
legislature increases punishment beyond
what was proscribed when the crime was
consummated." Weaver v. Graham, 450
U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 965, 67
L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). We have already
determined that the 2001 amendment is not
an ex post facto law. In this section, then,
we treat Defendant's due process claim
only insofar as it is advanced on a footing
independent of his ex post facto argument.
**18 Defendant, who has managed to garner nine
previous DUI convictions, does not argue that, at
the time of the instant DUI offense, he was without
notice that his conduct was prohibited by law.
Indeed, any such argument would be unsuccessful,
as it is well-settled that "[i]gnorance ... of [the] law
is no defense to a crime." Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-304(2) (1999). Thus, Defendant was deemed
to be on notice of the 2001 amendment to the DUI
law, and the legal consequences thereof, as of its
effective date of April 30, 2001, see Utah Motor
Vehicle Act, ch. 289, § 41-6-44(6)(a), 2001 Utah
Laws 1349, 1350, which was nearly one year before
Defendant's current DUI offense, committed on
April 26, 2002.
**19 Instead, Defendant maintains that, at the time
of his 1995 and 1998 convictions, he was
constitutionally entitled to "specific notice" that
those convictions could later be used to enhance a
subsequent DUI offense to a third degree felony.
The United States Supreme Court responded to a
similar argument in Nichols v. United States, 511
U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994).
In Nichols, the defendant argued that "at a
minimum, due process requires a misdemeanor
defendant to be warned that his conviction might be
used for enhancement purposes should the
defendant later be convicted of another crime." Id.
at 748, 114 S.Ct. at 1928. The Court disagreed,
stating:
No such requirement was suggested in Scott [v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d
383 (1979)], and we believe with good reason. In
the first place, a large number of misdemeanor
convictions take place in police or justice courts

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

81P.3d775
81 P.3d 775, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 2003 UT App 381
(Cite as: 81 P.3d 775, 2003 UT App 381)
which are not courts of record. Without a drastic
change in the procedures of these courts, there
would be no way to memorialize any such
warning. Nor is it at all clear exactly how
expansive the warning would have to be; would a
Georgia court *782 have to warn the defendant
about permutations and commutations of
recidivist statutes in 49 other States, as well as the
criminal history provision of the Sentencing
Guidelines applicable in federal courts? And a
warning at the completely general level-that if he
is brought back into court on another criminal
charge, a defendant such as Nichols will be
treated more harshly-would merely tell him what
he must surely already know. [FN8]
FN8. Many other courts have echoed the
Supreme Court's statements in Nichols,
rejecting the notion that a criminal
defendant is constitutionally entitled to
specific notice that the instant conviction
may later be used for enhancement
purposes should the defendant be
convicted of a subsequent crime. See State
v. Chapman, 685 A.2d 423, 425 (Me. 1996)
(rejecting defendant's argument that her
prior DUI convictions could not be
considered for purposes of enhancement
and holding that "[defendant's due process
claim fails [because a]fter the effective
date of the amendment [to the DUI law],
defendant had fair notice that a conviction
for operating under the influence would
subject her to the currently defined
penalty"); State v. Zoellner, 920 S.W.2d
132, 135-36 (Mo.Ct.App. 1996) (rejecting
defendant's due process argument that he "
'had no reason to believe nor did he know
that by entering pleas to two [prior DUI
charges], that he was "two-thirds of the
way" to a felony offense' " and stating that
"a trial court is not required to inform a
defendant who pleads guilty that the
legislature may amend the law in the
future"); State v. Arguello, 655 N.W.2d
451, 452-53 (S.D.2002) (per curiam)
(rejecting
defendant's
due
process
argument that "because he was not
informed that [his two prior DUI]
convictions could subsequently be used to
enhance his [current DUI] sentence they
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are void for enhancement purposes" and
stating that "[a] 'defendant is not entitled,
as a constitutional right, ... to information
regarding the future use of his conviction
for purposes of enhancement' ") (quoting
Presley v. State, 498 So.2d 832, 833
(Miss. 1986)); State v. Edwards, 302 S.C.
492, 397 S.E.2d 88, 89-90 (1990)
(rejecting
defendant's
due
process
argument and stating: "The inquiry is not
whether appellant had notice of the 1988
amendment at the time of his 1983
conviction, but whether he had fair notice
of the amendment when he committed the
current offense on February 3, 1989.
Because the current offense took place
after the effective date of the amendment,
appellant clearly had notice that his 1983
conviction would be considered in
determining his punishment for the current
offense. Therefore, appellant's due process
rights have not been violated.").
Id Defendant cites rule 9-301 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration to support his due process
argument. Rule 9-301 applies to "justice courts in
those cases where the defendant may be subject to
an enhanced penalty if convicted of the same
offense in the future." Utah Code Jud. Admin.
R9-301. In such cases, the rule states that, "upon
the entry of a plea of guilty, the justice court judge
shall [a]dvise the defendant, orally and in writing of
the defendant's rights, the elements of the charged
offense, the penalties for the charged offense, and
the enhancement penalty which may be imposed in
the event the defendant is convicted of the same
offense in the future." Utah Code Jud. Admin.
R9-301(2)-(2)(A).
**20 It is unclear, first of all, whether rule 9-301
applies outside of the context of determining the
validity of a criminal defendant's guilty plea.
Defendant does not state whether or not he pled
guilty in connection with the 1995 conviction, but
merely alleges that the offense "was prosecuted in
the Justice Court as a Class B misdemeanor" and
that he was not given "specific notice" of the
possibility of third degree felony enhancement for
subsequent DUI convictions.
[9] [10] **21 Additionally, Defendant provides no
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citations to the record to support his argument that
he was not advised of the possibility of
enhancement at the time of his prior convictions.
[FN9] Defendant instead argues *783 that M[t]he
State has not provided written evidence to prove
that Defendant was so advised," but it is
Defendant's burden, not the State's, to provide
citations to the record to support his legal
arguments on appeal. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9)
("The brief of the appellant shall contain ... citations
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on.").
FN9. Even assuming Defendant did plead
guilty to the charges culminating in his
prior DUI convictions, it does not follow
that those pleas would be invalidated for
enhancement purposes based solely on a
failure to comply with rule 9-301 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. It is
well-settled that
failure to comply with [procedural rules,
including] rule 11 [of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure] in taking a guilty plea
does not in itself amount to a violation of a
defendant's rights under either the Utah or
the United States Constitution. To
[collaterally attack a conviction], a
petitioner must show more than a violation
of the prophylactic provisions of [a
procedural rule]; he or she must show that
the guilty plea was in fact not knowing and
voluntary.
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992
(Utah 1993). For a plea to be knowing and
voluntary, "an accused must be 'fully
aware of the direct consequences' of a
guilty plea." State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d
1303, 1304 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (quoting
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755,
90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747
(1970)), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah
1995) (emphasis in original). However, "
'[i]f the consequence flowing from the plea
is "collateral," then the defendant need not
be informed of it before entering the plea.'
" Id (quoting Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d
941, 944 (7th Cir.1989), cert denied, 493
U.S. 1059, 110 S.Ct. 873, 107 L.Ed.2d
956 (1990)). "A collateral consequence is
one that is not related to the length or

nature of the sentence imposed on the basis
of the plea." Id. Courts that have
considered the question have held that
failure to advise a criminal defendant of
the possibility of enhancement should he
later be convicted of another crime is a
collateral, and not a direct consequence of
pleading guilty, and Defendant cites no
authority to suggest otherwise. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brownlie, 915 F.2d 527,
528 (9th Cir.1990) ("The possibility that
the defendant will be convicted of another
offense in the future and will receive an
enhanced sentence based on an instant
conviction is not a direct consequence of a
guilty plea."); People v. Marez, 39 P.3d
1190, 1193-94 (Colo.2002) ("It is also
well-settled that the consequences of
subsequent acts by a defendant, even if
those consequences are enhanced by an
earlier guilty plea, are collateral rather than
direct consequences of the earlier plea and
therefore are not consequences of which
the defendant must have been advised
upon entering the earlier plea."); Ex parte
Dumitru, 850 S.W.2d 243, 244-45
(Tex.App.1993) ("[I]t is well settled that a
trial court is not required to admonish a
defendant that the consequences of her
plea include the possibility that the
conviction which ensues from the plea
might be used for enhancement purposes in
a subsequent trial").
**22 Furthermore, the "specific notice" Defendant
claims he was entitled to in 1995, i.e., that in the
future the Legislature would amend the DUI law so
that a third DUI conviction in ten years would be
charged as a third degree felony, would have been
impossible to give. At most, the justice court can
be responsible only for advising Defendant of the
possibility of enhancement based on the DUI statute
in force at the time of a future conviction, and
again, Defendant has provided no evidence showing
that he was not so advised.
**23 In any event, Defendant has not shown that
he was constitutionally entitled to "specific notice"
at the time of his prior DUI convictions that those
offenses could be used to enhance his current DUI
conviction to a third degree felony. Thus,
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Defendant's due process argument is unavailing.
CONCLUSION
**24 The trial court correctly determined that
application of the enhancement provision of the
2001 amendment to Defendant's current DUI
conviction violates neither the ex post facto nor due
process clauses of the United States Constitution.
**25 Affirmed.
**26 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge.
81 P.3d 775, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 2003 UT
App 381
END OF DOCUMENT
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In Marshall, we held that the 2001 amendment to
the DUI statute was not an ex post facto law. See
2003 UT App 381 at f 18. In light of our holding
in Marshall, the trial court's order dismissing
Defendant's third degree felony DUI charge is
reversed, and the case is remanded for such
proceedings as may now be in order.
WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge.
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Before Judges JACKSON, BENCH, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
ORME, Judge:
*1 The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of a
charge of driving under the influence (DUI), a third
degree felony given enhancement for prior DUI
convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2),
(6)(a) (Supp.2001). The State argues that the trial
court improperly dismissed the charge based on its
conclusion that the 2001 amendment to the DUI
statute, as applied to Defendant's pre-amendment
DUIs, violates the constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto laws.
Because this case involves the same issue of
statutory interpretation, similar procedural history,
and the same legal counsel as in State v. Marshall,
2003 UT App 381, we granted the parties'
stipulated motion to consolidate the two cases for
purposes of oral argument. See Utah R.App. P. 3(b).
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